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A ‘crisis’, but of what?2
Noel Castree
University of Manchester
England
Abstract
The current economic crisis has generated a discussion about its fundemental causes.
Five major explanations for the crisis have been put forth by different stakeholders and critics.
We analyze each of the five explanations and critically reflect, from a Marxist perspective,
upon the vested power interests and political consequences in promoting this or that
explanation.
Key words: economic crisis, globalisation, capitalism
Introduction
This conference is called ‘Beyond globalisation’. Even though no question mark was
added to it, I assume it was nonetheless intended. If we ask ‘Beyond globalisation?’, then our
attention is focussed on two issues of considerable contemporary significance. First, is 2009
the beginning of a period of major change to the global political economy? The word
‘beyond’ invites us to reflect on this question. Second, if the immediate past is indeed being
eclipsed, then is that period best described as an era of ‘globalisation’?
These will be my questions. And I want to address them by focussing on the theme of
‘crisis’. I do this for a couple of reasons, one of which is fairly obvious. As we all know, by
spring 2008 metaphors like ‘financial firestorm’, ‘credit tsunami’ and ‘economic meltdown’
became commonplace in media, political and business circles. The defaults on sub-prime
mortgages in US in summer 2007 had sent the financial house of cards tumbling within a few
short months. After Lehman Brothers collapsed exactly a year ago, comparisons were being
made to the Wall Street Crash and the subsequent Great Depression of the 1930s. These
comparisons have proven to be inaccurate, for the time being. Even so, a synchronised global
recession of geographically varied seriousness has now set-in, with unemployment at almost
10% in what remains the world’s largest economy, the United States. Meanwhile, countries
not directly responsible for the financial crisis – such as the Czech Republic – have been
forced to suffer the consequences of weakening demand for export goods and a scarcity of
investment capital. In short, the after-effects of the financial crisis have spread far beyond
Wall Street and the Square Mile.
The word ‘crisis’, of course, means ‘a turning point’, a ‘moment of decision’ and ‘an
unstable or critical time’ – at least according to my Oxford English Dictionary. And this is the
second reason why I focus on the theme of crisis this morning. Many agree that the 20 months
subsequent to August 2007 were a period of ‘crisis’ – but a crisis of what, exactly? Financial
(de)regulation, casino banking, neoliberalism …?
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Commentators have fallen over themselves to answer this cardinal question, to suggest
immediate solutions and to prescribe longer-term remedies. What I’d like to do this morning
is quickly survey the principal crisis narratives that have appeared in everything from the
mass media to academic publications over the last two years. I’ll be focussing on the English
language discussions, as they’ve occurred in daily newspapers, television news reports, think
tank publications, books by financial professionals and other arenas. I range so widely
because the 2007-09 ‘crisis’ was a very public one: few people were unaware of it, at least in
Europe, and its fall-out implicates all of us as tax-payers, employees and citizens. The era of
‘globalisation’ has produced its first global crisis and its first global recession. As I’ll suggest
below, depending on which set of knowledge producers and consumers we look at, rather
different explanations of the recent ‘crisis’ and how to address its fall-out are to be found. Yet
most, as we’ll see, make little or no mention of ‘globalisation’ as a salient analytical category,
and rightly so.
Interpretation 1: corrupt and greedy bankers are to blame
The speed with spring 2007 defaults on ‘sub-prime’ American mortgages triggered a
late year global ‘credit crunch’ left the heads of financiers, regulators and politicians spinning.
For the average citizen it was even more bewildering, or simply bemusing. Talk of leveraged
borrowing, derivatives and securitised loans made little sense to the person on the street –
such as the thousands of Northern Rock account holders who, in September 2007, queued to
remove their savings from what they thought was a dependable high street lender. But by the
new year, those with little appetite for the intricacies of high finance were thrown a gift:
something recognisable to blame. Jerome Kerviel, a junior futures trader with Société
Générale, was arrested in January 2008 for unauthorised dealing leading to losses of 4.9
billion Euro. But his malfeasance was as nothing compared with that of the new poster-boy
for financial corruption. Bernard Madoff, a highly respected Wall Street investor, was
sentenced to 150 years in prison for operating the largest Ponzi scheme in world history. His
prosecutors claimed losses of $65 billion on behalf of their now mostly bankrupt clients.
Madoff is to the noughties what Nick Leeson was to the nineties.
Unsurprisingly, the tabloid press and the other vox pop parts of the news media had a
field-day with these cases. They served a pedagogic purpose that bookended 2008, after
frenetic months when political economic leaders and the media had found it easier to describe
unfolding events than explain them. Kerviel and Madoff’s corruption usefully personalised
the causes of a crisis that most people simply did not understand. Little matter that both men’s
actions were largely irrelevant to the liquidity drought that had pitched the world’s ‘real
economy’ into recession by early 2009. But the search for villains did not begin-and-end with
a few ‘rogue traders’. Even the most demagogic elements of the news media could not
pretend that this was the nub of the problem. Instead, the spotlight was shone on a broader set
of actors and a rather different cause: namely, high financiers in general (‘fat cats’) and their
collective greed in particular.
This story-line became a common-place of the low- and middle-brow news media
throughout 2008 and 2009. For instance, Britain’s most popular tabloid, TheSun, repeatedly
invoked the image of City bankers as pigs gorging themselves in troughs of money. The
attribution of collective blame typically focussed on two things. First, it was suggested that
pretty much the entire financial class was guilty of reckless self-aggrandizement. In Britain,
the way Northern Rock’s former chief executive Adam Applegarth was pilloried in the gutter
press from late 2007 was emblematic of this. Once it became clear – by early 2008 – that
virtually every high street and investment bank had engaged in high-risk lending practices,
blaming individuals like Applegarth became rather pointless (even as it satisfied public
bloodlust). The collective guilt thesis was dramatised in February 2008, when the leaders of
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HBOS and Royal Bank of Scotland were cross-examined by the Treasury Select Committee
of the House of Commons. The four chief bankers under the spotlight all issued a public
apology for the harm their lack of proper oversight had caused. This was, evidently, a
problem caused not by a few reckless financiers but by almost all of those found in banking’s
upper echelons.
If such apologies served to locate blame at the level of chief executives and their
boards, the notion that greed was a key driver was seemingly evidenced time and again
through 2008 and the early part of 2009. This brings us to the second focus of the selfish
bankers storyline: the huge severance packages given to the senior financiers who had led
their companies – and the wider world economy – over the cliff. The sense of public outrage
about this was intensified by the extraordinary fiscal and monetary measures that public
authorities worldwide put in place to rescue the financial system: this meant, in effect, that
tax-payers were richly rewarding already uber-wealthy executives for their catastrophic
failures. In Britain, former RBS chief Fred Goodwin became a cause celebre, with his
Edinburgh home requiring a police guard once details of his exorbitant pension payment were
reported in the media. In the US, the newly installed President sensed the public mood when
in spring 2009 he strongly criticised those running insurer AIG for awarding lavish employee
bonuses – this when the firm still required federal government funds to survive.
For all its popular appeal, it is not difficult to point out the analytical deficiencies of
the ‘corrupt and greedy bankers’ narrative. While high finance’s ‘masters of the universe’
must certainly take responsibility for their reckless actions, to abstract them as a group from
the wider political economy serves to obscure a number of important factors. ‘Greed’ is not
much of an explanatory category either, implying as it does some transhistorical human
impulse that threatens to manifest itself in the absence of proper checks. Even so, the idea that
individual corruption and collective greed together explain the recent economic crisis is
undeniably powerful. Its relative simplicity makes it easy for mass audiences to understand;
its focus on individuals and their wider clique taps-in to a venerable public need to identify
villains; and, at the end of the day, the idea is easy for those promoting it to evidence. On top
of this, it has widespread political appeal: it resonates with conservatives, liberals and social
democrats alike. In Britain, for instance, New Labour has had cause to use it on occasion (no
doubt to deflect attention from its own role in deregulating City finance from 1997 onwards),
while the Conservatives have found it very helpful in attempts to win over potential voters in
the run-up to a general election. Outside the political mainstream, Interpretation 1 can also
prove strategically useful to radicals on both the Left and the Right. In normative terms, it
licenses punitive action against bankers (of the sort meted out to Madoff) who must be
‘reigned in’ and ‘held to account’. That regulators and legislators have thus far done little to
punish financial high-flyers only serves to further dismay large sections of the general public.
At the time of writing (September 2009), critics are pressing the Obama and Brown
administrations to put Wall Street and City fat cats on a stringent diet overseen by more
rigorous regulators.
Interpretation 2: ‘light touch’ regulation is to blame
Soon after the ‘credit crunch’ set-in, many in the worlds of business, politics,
academia and the serious news media began to talk about financial ‘regulation’ – the lack of
it, to be precise – as the principal problem. Such talk sounds dry and overly technical to the
average person. But it is meat-and-drink to that significant minority of people who play very
close attention to how business practice is governed by public authorities. These people
include economics correspondents who ply their trade outside the populist sections of the
media; business professionals in the financial sector and beyond; elected and appointed public
servants tasked with the job of oversight; and social scientists based in think tanks,
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foundations, economics departments and business schools. If publications like The Economist,
the Financial Times and Business Week are anything to go by, ‘regulatory failure’ has become
a favoured explanation among large sections of the world’s political economic elite and the
business commentariat. In simple terms, the argument is that too much commercial freedom
was afforded to financiers large, medium and small. Former House speaker Newt Gingrich
phrased it thus: the current crisis, he opined, “is a government problem, not a market
problem” (Freeland 2009, 22).
This interpretation has considerable empirical warrant. The so-called ‘high risk, high
reward’ approach to finance was indulged by regulators and law makers worldwide for over
20 years. Indeed, it was in one sense created by them – Clinton’s repeal of the Depression-era
Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 being a signal example. In the US and Britain, where global
banking assumes huge national importance, the good times yielded colossal tax returns for
central government, thousands of largely well-paid financial services jobs, and an associated
‘wealth effect’ as Wall Street and City employees spent their considerable earnings. But the
price of success was a misplaced belief that the interests of finance capital were coincident
with the public interest. Regulatory under-sight became normalised. Examples abound and
have been easy for proponents of the ‘under-regulation’ interpretation to cite. For instance, in
recent years law makers and regulators in the Anglo-American world have: removed the
firewall separating high street and investment banks; allowed excessive leverage, with some
banks having debt-to-equity ratios as high as 30:1; permitted the proliferation of complex
financial instruments such as collateralised debt obligations and credit default swaps;
sanctioned a reward structure in which finance professionals are richly rewarded for making
continuous, short-term gain for their investors and shareholders; allowed ‘too large to fail’
banks to form through mergers and acquisitions; raised no objections to institutions that seek
returns on very high risk investments; not objected to hand-in-glove relationships between
credit ratings agencies, companies insuring against non-performing investments and the
international banks; and sanctioned the emergence of a so-called ‘shadow banking system’ in
which ‘special investment vehicles’ operated with almost no public accountability.
In the detail, the charge-sheet is very long, but it reduces to two principal claims. First,
that politicians and public administrators were far too trusting in finance capital’s powers of
‘self-regulation’, based on the so-called ‘efficient markets hypothesis’ (which says that
financial markets produce sufficient information to continuously self-correct). The first
chairman of Britain’s Financial Services Authority (FSA), Sir Howard Davies, summarised
this faith in the invisible hand with striking candour. “The philosophy from when I set it up”,
he admitted in 2008, “has been to say ‘Consenting adults in private? That’s their problem
really’” (Wade 2008, 13). The second major charge is that gaps in regulatory oversight were
allowed to develop. For instance, reflecting on the post-1997 division of labour between the
Bank of England and the FSA, the Bank’s deputy governor Paul Tucker said that “we left an
underlap between us” (Moya 2009, 23). He was referring to the Authority’s micro-regulatory
focus on individual banks and the Bank’s macro-regulatory focus on keeping inflation low:
this meant that neither organisation was tasked with monitoring or addressing a build-up of
systemic risk across the banking sector as a whole.
As with Interpretation 1 of the recent crisis, the ‘light touch’ regulation narrative is
polyvalent in the political sense. Those who signed-up to ‘self-regulating’ finance from the
get-go have been able offer-up mea culpas in its name, just as much as their critics have used
it to say ‘We told you so’. The difference lies in their preferred solutions. Students of J.K.
Galbraith, Keynes and the American economist Hyman Minsky have called for a ‘new
financial architecture’ whose principles and institutions would protect the public interest
against the private agendas of risk-taking banks. Even some of those directly responsible for
regulatory failure were, in the dark days of late 2008, given to such talk (Gordon Brown being
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a prime example). In addition, realists and pragmatists in the Marxian camp and on the
socialist Left see the tactical sense in beefing-up financial regulation. Among the measures
suggested have been a new Glass-Steagall Act, far tougher capital adequacy requirements and
accounting standards, the outlawing of ‘off-balance-sheet’ banking, the de-universalisation of
the short-term ‘shareholder value’ investment model, greater consumer protection from
‘predatory lending’, the break-up of overly large banks, and the creation of a ‘Tobin tax’ on
certain cross-border financial transactions. There have been many other suggestions besides.
In virtually every case, the policies would have to be implemented and enforced
internationally. One of the remarkable oddities of recent history is that while finance capital
has been borderless, its regulation has remained largely in the hands of national bodies like
the US Securities and Exchange Commission.
These muscular proposals for change have so far fallen on deaf ears. As I noted above,
the normative lessons of the ‘under-regulation’ narrative can easily be made consistent with
the aspirations of those who do not want the visible hand of the state ‘interfering’ too much
with finance capital’s operations. The new FSA banking code is a case in point. Issued in
August 2009, it sets out eight principles that should govern the operation of City banks and
sets new standards of information sharing and transparency. But it falls far short of the sort of
meaty measures called for by proponents of a new financial architecture. Journalist John
Kampfner dismissed it as “a gentle entreaty to Britain’s financial services industry to behave
better” (2009, 26). The reason, it has been widely suggested, is politicians’ fear of City and
Wall Street jobs disappearing overseas to financial centres with less stringent regulatory
requirements. This, presumably, drove Alistair Darling and Tim Geithner to face-down the
call of premiers Sarkozy and Merkel to control bankers’ bonuses at the September G20
meeting. The policy debate that divides those otherwise persuaded by the ‘regulatory failure’
interpretation is thus focussed on the following question: ‘how much financial regulation, of
what sort, and at what geographical scale’?
Interpretation 3: ‘casino finance’ is to blame
Regulation requires two parties: regulators and the regulated. The third interpretation
is really the flip-side of the second, and has been advanced by those who prefer, for whatever
reason, to emphasise structural problems within the financial sector. This interpretation
focuses on the ‘rational irrationality’ of banks and related private sector actors. The spotlight
is here trained on how financial operators chose to exercise the freedom afforded to them by
permissive regulators. Unlike the rather populist Interpretation 1, this one backgrounds greed
and foregrounds a tragedy of the financial commons in which a frantic race for profit brought
ruin to all. In October 2008 Congressional testimony, former Federal Reserve Bank chairman
Alan Greenspan suggested these operators had ‘underpriced’ the systemic risk their own
actions created – perhaps trying to deflect attention from his own lapses as Fed chairman
during the Clinton era. Those less intimate with the world of high finance have preferred to
use gambling analogies. For instance, the widely respected MP Vince Cable – Treasury
spokesman for the British LibDem Party – has frequently compared modern financiers to
those who frequent casinos (echoing Susan Strange, author of the prescient Casino capitalism
[1997]).
Once again, the evidence to support this interpretation of events is not hard to seek.
Given a lax regulatory environment, it’s no surprise that individual financial institutions
entered into a competitive battle in which ‘financial innovation’ was seen as a key to success.
The ‘originate and distribute’ approach to asset-backed securities is one of many cases in
point. This approach became commonplace from the early 1990s, with City and Wall Street
financiers in the vanguard. Traditional banks used to offer loans from depositors’ savings, and
received their returns direct from clients over a period of months or years. The post-traditional
15

banks of the last 20 years preferred to repackage loans and divide them into tranches to be
sold-on immediately to institutional investors, pension fund managers or other financial
institutions. These tranches were hedged against defaults by taking out insurance, and their
cost to investors varied depending on the levels of risk and reward involved. By distributing
the risks of potentially non-performing loans far and wide, the originators of tranches enjoyed
instant returns on their lending while minimising their own vulnerability to defaults. They
also off-loaded debt, enabling them to lend more money and do more business in a seemingly
virtuous spiral. The problem, however, is that they were emboldened to seek-out ever riskier
lending opportunities – such as sub-prime mortgages – in the belief that any resulting
problems would be diffused across the entire financial system. As it turned out, the problems
infected the system rather than being – as per the expectation – absorbed by it.
The dysfunctionality of the originate and distribute practices pursued by banks is but
one example of what, in retrospect, looks like a form of widespread madness within the
financial sector. But to call it madness is too easy. According to the third interpretation of
crisis, it is better seen as a case of collective irrationality wherein individual banks continued
to push the envelope so long as the profits came rolling in. In Robin Blackburn’s words, “if
[finance capital] is unaccountable and unregulated it becomes sovereign in the capital reallocation process, and … grab[s] the lion’s share of the gains it makes possible, including
anticipated gains before they have been realised” (2008, 84). An awful lot of brain power and
ingenuity went into creating the family of complex financial products and practices whose
names are now tainted (‘over the counter trades’, hedge funds etc.). And an awful lot of
money was made, for financial institutions, their shareholders and their many clients. In a
sense, the numerous innovations conjured-up by traders, dealers, brokers and all the rest
worked. And because they worked no one bank or bond insurer or ratings agency was
prepared to call time on them, even though the party had to end sometime – just as the
‘roaring 20s’ came to an abrupt halt by that decade’s end.
As with Interpretation 2, the precise normative and policy implications of
Interpretation 3 are rather varied. It licenses more-or-less intrusive regulation by public
authorities, but at a minimum suggests that certain financial products and practices are far too
risky to continue unabated. As Adair Turner, head of the FSA, said in August this year (much
to the City’s consternation): far too many financial services are ‘socially useless’. As such,
this interpretation resonates with those who favour rather mild or very strong reform alike.
Chastened free marketers and those (Left or Right) in favour of less business-friendly
regulation can relate to the casino finance narrative equally. The need for some form of
‘macro-prudential regulation’ of the banks has been their mantra. These banks, the argument
goes, must be made more ‘moral’ and obliged to rediscover a sense of their proper role in
sustaining both real economic activity and social stability. Like the ‘light touch’ regulation
narrative, Interpretation 3 focuses squarely on the financial sector per se and its governance.
This is a strength – after all, regulators and financiers must take considerable responsibility
for their reckless (in)actions. But it is also a weakness – at least from the perspective of the
next interpretation. For it brackets-out a whole set of absolutely critical considerations,
leading Jean Pisani-Ferry and Indhira Santos to opine that “… many analysts have failed to
grasp fully the character of the [recent] crisis” (2009, 9).
Interpretation 4: macro-economic imbalances are to blame
The fourth interpretation of the recent crisis aims to set finance capital in a wider
economic context. As such, it folds interpretations two and three together and shows them to
be but elements of a much larger story. This interpretation has been voiced by a number of
individuals within the worlds of business journalism, politics and financial regulation; and it
has been articulated by a number of analysts located in think tanks and universities. It is a
16

rather technical, big picture interpretation that most members of the general public are only
dimly aware of. It speaks to grand questions of economic history and geography rather than
questions of micro-finance, regulatory procedure or bankers’ presumed motives. One of its
more famous proponents summarises it well: “Today’s credit crisis”, writes Martin Wolf in
Fixingglobal finance, “is a symptom of an unbalanced world economy” (2008, 5).
This interpretation’s starting point is the excess liquidity sloshing around the global
economy this last twenty years or so. Without this liquidity, the financial sector would not
have had the raw material needed to put its various complex instruments to work. From where
did this liquidity originate? Two main sources: namely, the Middle East – reaping the
continued rewards of oil exports – and several Far Eastern countries, whose growth has been
based to a large extent on manufacturing exports. The latter include China, still the world’s
fastest growing economy, and Japan, still one of the world’s largest economies even after its
‘lost decade’ triggered by a bursting property bubble 15 years ago. Why did countries in these
two regions elect to run trade surpluses? In the Middle East there was little choice: the
benefits of controlling oil needed by the rest of the world guaranteed colossal revenue streams
relative to levels of domestic investment and consumption. In the Far East, one must look to
the economic crisis of 1997-8 and the earlier Japanese crisis. These persuaded policy makers
of the need to save for a rainy day and, specifically, of the need to convert surpluses into the
world’s ‘universal’ (or ‘reserve’) currency, the US dollar. These measures would help
stabilise the value of domestic money and insure against speculative attacks on home
currencies. Though not badly affected by the 1997-8 meltdown, these lessons were learned by
the Chinese too.
How was this achieved? To earn dollars several Far Eastern countries fixed the
exchange rate of their domestic currencies to the dollar at a favourable level. This ensured that
their exports to the US – still the world’s largest economy, even in the current recession –
remained affordable for American consumers. So too did their relatively cheap labour costs
(Japanexcepted), giving them a competitive advantage over many other overseas producers.
The resulting dollar surpluses were either used to pay-off outstanding debts, hoarded, invested
or lent to others. The most significant of these ‘others’ was the United States. After the
dot.com bubble burst in the early noughties, direct foreign investment in the American
economy became much less attractive. So East Asian countries (and some Middle Eastern
ones) began to buy US Treasury bonds – traditionally, a reliable source of long-term income.
This was (and remains) especially true of China. These bonds were issued readily by
successive US administrations in need of liquidity to fund tax cuts and the high costs of
government, including wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because this liquidity originated
overseas, it did not raise the costs of domestic borrowing (which would’ve occurred had the
government sourced money from US savers). Interest rates thus remained low, enabling
financial institutions within and connected to Wall Street to expand their deposits and loans
greatly. So it was that surpluses accumulated on one side of the world became transferred en
masse to fund the US fiscal deficit, which led to cheap money for the domestic banks to
spend. A good deal of this money went into US consumer borrowing and housing, so
maintaining American demand for imports from Far and Middle Eastern countries.
This interpretation of the ‘deep causes’ of the recent crisis can be looked at from two
angles. The ‘savings glut’ perspective blames those economies who accumulated large dollar
surpluses. They are charged with obliging the US to be ‘consumer of the last resort’, a role it
took-on to avoid global deflation. They should, the argument goes, have spent more and lent
less. Successive chairmen of the Federal Reserve Bank have been notable authors of this
perspective. The ‘money glut’ perspective looks at the coin from the other side. It points a
finger at WashingtonDC. By running unprecedented trade deficits, the federal government is
charged with living beyond its means. Maintaining the dollar’s strength against a number of
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currencies also made it more difficult for its export industries to earn overseas revenue, while
benefiting dollar-rich Wall Street banks in their foreign ventures. In addition, the weak
industrial policy of all administrations since Carter’s meant a lack of strategic investment in
new industries. However, Wall Street is not let off the hook. Benefitting from the low interest
rates set by Alan Greenspan, the financial sector could arguably have invested in new
productive activities with high export potential. Instead, a consumer credit and housing
bubble was produced – sub-prime mortgages being part of this. In Britain, New Labour, the
Bank of England and the City were responsible for similar policies being pursued. Indeed, the
‘money glut’ perspective is consistent with the idea of a ‘First World debt crisis’, centred on
the Anglo-American zone and fuelled by Japan and numerous developing world lenders.
Clearly, the normative implications of Interpretation 4 are far-reaching and appeal to
those given – by inclination or profession – to strategising about geopolitics and
geoeconomics. Critics of the US, but also many within the American establishment, have
argued that it can no longer live beyond its means. It must borrow less, save more, devalue its
currency, invest more in value-creating business ventures, and even relinquish the right of
‘seigniorage’. This is consistent with the ‘money glut’ perspective. One the other side,
advocates of the ‘savings glut’ perspective argue that large trade surplus economies must
(among other things), inflate their currencies, tolerate a dollar deflation, invest more at home,
increase domestic wages and fund major public works in order to stimulate demand. What
unites the two perspectives on Interpretation 4 is a recognition that global institutional reform
is required that extends way beyond rethinking how finance per se is governed. Tinkering
with the remit of the G20’s new Financial Stability Board’s (formerly the G7’s Financial
Stability Forum) is thus not nearly enough. A modern-day Bretton Woods regime has been
called for – only this time, a ‘global new deal’ would not be organised around US hegemony,
and global governance institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and a new World
Financial Authority would reflect this change of circumstance. They would be democratic and
pluralistic organisations dedicated to managing global affairs in the interests of numerous
countries and power blocs.
Relative to all the previous interpretations of the recent financial crisis, the fourth adds
a much-needed macro-economic, geopolitical and historical dimension. Its advocates consider
it superior on these grounds, and there is copious evidence to support either the savings or
money glut versions of the thesis. Economic nationalists can derive strategic lessons from this
interpretation germane to their own country’s future, while internationalists can argue for a
managed transition away from US dominance. However, its complexity ensures that this
interpretation lacks the popular resonance of Interpretation 1. It is an interpretation operative
only among those versed in the technicalities of global political economy – the sort of people
who read The Economist, UNCTAD reports or academic journal essays about world affairs.
This also applies to the fifth and final interpretation of the 2007-09 meltdown. The difference,
as we will now see, is that this next interpretation is strongly favoured by commentators on
both the reformist and revolutionary wings of the Left. This is because it supplements
Interpretation 4 with concepts and evidence that radicalise its already considerable normative
implications.
Interpretation 5: Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism is to blame
The fifth take on the recent crisis has been put forward by several academics
influenced by Marxism, but also by some outside universities who criticise neoliberalism in
the name of a more socially just model of capitalism – such as Graham Turner, author of The
Credit Crunch (2008). This interpretation has not been loudly voiced in business circles or
mainstream politics, let alone the mass media. But one or two within the political economic
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establishment have been prepared to lend it credence – such as the distinguished British excivil servant Sir Tim Lankester (2009).
The key to this interpretation is the 1970s, which is the last time the Western
economies experienced a coordinated recession akin to today’s. Forty years ago, the post-war
Keynesian compact began to crumble. The leading capitalist economies experienced varying
degrees of stagflation: weak economic growth accompanied by rising prices. The crisis
proved an opportunity for ‘neoliberal’ thinking to enter the fray, notably in the US and UK
from 1979 onwards. In the name of personal and corporate ‘freedom’, the neoliberal
programme emphasised the need to remove ‘barriers’ to free trade. It replaced the Keynesian
focus on demand management with a concern to keep inflation low at all costs, by controlling
the money supply. As the Reagan and Thatcher administrations showed, domestically this
meant destroying most of the norms and institution of post-war managed capitalism. Trade
union power was assailed, many ‘unproductive’ industries allowed to perish, labour markets
‘deregulated’, wage controls removed, tax breaks given to the corporate sector, and many
state activities privatised or contracted out. This domestic agenda was scaled-up to the
international level in the form of what later became known as ‘globalisation’. From the early
1980s, Washington pressed its allies to remove restrictions on international trade, lending and
investment – with Britain an influential comrade-in-arms. The hope was that Anglo-Saxon
capitalism could create new lucrative pockets of comparative economic advantage by trading
in an expanded world system. But there were other reasons too. High labour costs in both
countries combined with decreasing unit transportation costs and new telecommunications
meant that domestic producers began to see geographic relocation and FDI as feasible
strategies. In addition, even as their economies were in recession through the late 70s and
early 80s, America and Britain retained their historic strength in banking and financial
services. They used this to international advantage by progressively deregulating Wall Street
and the City, and making them the centre of global liquidity flows. From the early 70s, both
places became switching points in the world economy, re-channeling rivers of money from
newly enriched oil states and ‘tiger economies’ to other parts of the world. The collapse of the
former communist bloc and the end of Chinese isolation simply reinforced their centrality
from the late 1980s onwards. The greater New York region and the south east of England duly
felt the benefits, as did the national treasuries receiving tax revenues.
What were the long-term effects of the neoliberal turn in the US and Britain?
According to proponents of Interpretation 5, they were less than salutary. First, both
economies became far too reliant on finance, construction and retail, and failed to invest
sufficiently in new ventures that could set domestic accumulation on a profitable, postindustrial path. Second, both countries’ manufacturing base was eviscerated, with many
home-grown producers electing to invest overseas – in Britain, Dyson (maker of vacuum
cleaners) became a well known example, repeating what iconic manufacturer General Motors
had been doing for years by decamping to Mexico. Thirdly, the share of national wealth
accruing to working people declined relative to that of those owning or running capitalist
enterprises. This has been documented by Robert Pollin (2003), Gerard Dumenil and
Dominique Levy (2004) – among others. According to David Harvey, in A brief history of
neoliberalism (2005), this amounts to a restoration of class power in the neoliberal heartlands,
but elsewhere besides. This new wealth inequality in the US and Britain – so Interpretation 5
goes – was achieved courtesy of four things: (i) China’s arrival on the world stage along with
other low cost exporters kept consumer prices down and weakened demands for wage hikes;
(ii) the credible threat of capital flight from the US and UK gave employers considerable
power over their workforces; (iii) easy credit provided by City and Wall Street lenders, in a
low interest environment, helped to conceal the fact of low wages for working class and lower
middle class people (and created a false sense of personal wealth); and (iv) the defeat of the
19

trades unions during the 1980s and the move to ‘flexible’ labour markets played havoc with
the organisational capacities of the (increasingly indebted) average working person.
In sum, proponents of Interpretation 5 argue that, post the 1970s crisis, neoliberal
policies succeeded in delivering economic growth in a range of countries worldwide –
including the two major proponents of laissez faire capitalism. However, because the benefits
of growth were skewed grotesquely in favour of the rich, the resulting ‘demand gap’ found in
the American and British populations was filled by saddling households with debt.
Meanwhile, new working populations in China, the Far East and the former communist bloc
have been made to accept low wages as the price for export-led growth. To be sure, many of
these workers have been lifted out of poverty by selling their labour power. But relative to the
wealth created by their collective workplace efforts, they have enjoyed meagre rewards.
Unlike 40 years ago, this crisis stems in large part from the weakness of wage labour. The fact
that defaults on sub-prime mortgages made to ‘ninjas’ lit the financial tinder indicates as
much (‘ninjas’ is a US mortgage brokers’ term for people with no income, no job and no
assets).
As I said above, proponents of Interpretation 5 add some missing ingredients to an
otherwise persuasive Interpretation 4. They also, as I additionally indicated, tend not be those
working in or around the worlds of politics, finance and commodity production. For reformist
proponents of Interpretation 5, a managed sharing of economic and political power between
the US and other major players – like Russia, Japan, the EU and China – should be
accompanied by measures to stimulate domestic demand worldwide. A precondition of this
would be a redistribution of wealth towards ordinary workers, increased public control of key
economic sectors, and a new ethic that values greater social equality over the responsibilities
and freedoms of individuals. These arguments do not chime with the thinking of business,
media and political elites in the major capitalist states. Revolutionary proponents of
Interpretation 5 go even further, unsurprisingly. For them, the current crisis is simply one of
several ways in which the ineluctable contradictions of capitalism can play-out. Here is Geoff
Mann, writing in New Left Review: “… regulation cannot be enough … The overthrow of
capital’s rule is literally the only way out” (2009, 126). Such an overthrow, clearly, would
require coordinated radical action globally, led by a resurgent labour movement and/or a more
tightly organised ‘anti-globalisation’ movement. The prospects of this are, needless to say,
vanishingly small. As Slavoj Zizek once said, it remains far easier to imagine the end of the
world than it does the end of capitalism.
A crisis of ‘globalisation’?
I’ve just outlined what seem to me to be the principal explanations of the recent crisis.
You’ll notice that I’ve not so far discussed ‘globalisation’, the theme of this conference. So,
was the 2007-09 crisis a crisis of globalisation? Is the current worldwide recession an
indictment of globalisation, whatever that term might mean? Well, clearly the crisis was
global in scale, even though it was centred on the UK and the US in particular. This is
because of the concerted attempts to remove so-called ‘barriers’ to trade and investment since
the mid-80s. But what I think is interesting is just now marginal the idea of globalisation has
been to recent discussions of economic turbulence. This seems true in Britain, at least. To the
extent that ‘globalisation’ has assumed a meaningful role in the debates, it’s been either as a
smokescreen or as a proxy for something else. Let me explain.
In March 2008, Gordon Brown’s press releases and media appearances were full of
talk about a ‘global crisis’ and a ‘worldwide financial crisis’. On a GM TV interview seen by
millions on March 4th he said this: “globalisation means that all countries are exposed to the
problems affecting the financial sector”. Subsequently, he and other G8 leaders spent some
weeks criticising so-called ‘offshore’ financial centres and tax-havens, as if they were
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somehow to blame for the financial meltdown. In his March 4th speech to the US Congress
this year, Brown once again repeatedly called the crisis ‘global’ as if this, in itself, was a
sufficient characterisation of the financial calamity. It’s clear to me, as I’m sure it is to you,
that this was an attempt to deflect people’s attention away from Brown’s own culpability.
When Chancellor of the Exchequer he created a system of weak regulatory oversight of City
banks during the 90s and new millennium. The fact is that it was the major global investment
banks that were at the vanguard of the financial meltdown, and virtually all of them were
based in New York and London, not the Cayman Islands or Antigua. One should also note
that Britain is ultimately responsible for several off-shore financial centres, several of which
are British principalities or protectorates.
Gordon Brown aside, a few others have pointed the finger at ‘globalisation’ too but in
less tendentious ways. For instance, writing in the LondonFinancial Times, columnist Krishna
Guha puts it thus: “There is”, he says, “a strong case to be made that the current crisis is in the
strictest sense a crisis of globalisation, fostered and transmitted by the … deep integration of
very different economies”. The business journalist and author Will Hutton (2009, 27) echoes
this when he says that “the interdependencies that produced such growth in the good times
have … the power to produce a self-reinforcing depressive vortex in bad times”. Guha and
Hutton are, of course, right in one sense. The reforms that began during the period of the socalled Washington Consensus certainly rendered many international borders more porous to
international flows of money, commodities and people. This is why us social scientists spent
so much of the 1995-2005 decade trying to define and measure ‘globalisation’. However, it
seems to me that Guha and Hutton are really referring to the geography of the current crisis,
not its root causes – which can, in theory, assume any number of spatial forms. For my
money, those causes are best described in the fourth and especially the fifth interpretation that
I summarised a few minutes ago. This said, the geography matters of course, and if any future
‘deglobalisation’ is to occur, the worry is that it might take a nationalist form of the sort that it
did during the 1930s. For now, it seems clear that the push to open-up borders has stalled. It
is, perhaps, significant that the US and China have just recently taken a trade issue to
arbitration within the WTO. The challenge for the international community is clear. How can
some semblance of order and social justice be achieved in a world of uneven geographical
development at a time the 20th century’s hegemon is clearly in decline? We need a new
globalisation project, but not one founded on principles of supposed ‘free trade’.
Conclusion
“The present-day plunge into the economic abyss”, writes R Taggart Murphy, “has …
brought forth a smorgasbord of assertions about ‘the’ cause” (2009, 149). In this paper I’ve
presented what I take to be the principal extant interpretations of the recent financial crisis.
They are not mutually exclusive, but they seem to me to be relatively distinct. These
interpretations have been variously promoted (and sometimes combined) by a range of
commentators who, depending on their social location, speak to more-or-less sizeable, moreor-less knowledgeable audiences ranged across the spectrum of political belief. Within its
own terms of intellectual reference, each interpretation has a certain efficacy. They can all be
copiously evidenced and each has a normative dimension that conforms to the moral-political
sentiments of different sections of the populations affected by the financial meltdown of
2007-09. They can even be combined into an omnibus explanation, supposing one can
stomach something so bloated. Here, for example, is Czech Prime Minister Jan Fischer
speaking at Chatman House in March 2009: “the financial crisis”, he said, “resulted from an
exceedingly complex interaction of market failures, global financial and monetary
imbalances, inappropriate regulation, weak supervision and poor macro-prudential oversight.”
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However, it seems to me that such a catch-all account detracts from efforts to identify
proximate and deep causes and to enumerate real policy alternatives moving forward.
Having remained studiously neutral thus far, let me now declare my own allegiances.
It seems to me that while the second and third interpretations speak to the proximate causes of
the recent crisis, the fourth but especially the fifth are the most telling of all. I offer this
judgement not on purely cognitive grounds, as if evidence and logic alone can distinguish
stronger from weaker interpretations. It is also a question of politics and values. The
economic growth achieved prior to the current recession was accompanied by a systematic
redistribution of wealth that greatly favoured the rich – This was no accident and it is morally
unacceptable. At base, the 2007-09 crisis was a crisis of class-based neoliberalism led by the
US (and secondarily Britain) – a project that ultimately failed to manage the venerable
overaccumulation tendencies of capitalism.
Of course, in the wider scheme of things me or anybody else saying this matters little.
In Social justice and thecity, his first book as a Marxist, David Harvey wisely insisted that
“It’s irrelevant to ask whether concepts … are ‘true’ or ‘false’. We have to ask, rather, what it
is that produces them and what they serve to produce” (1973, 298). This injunction should be
taken to heart. Ultimately, the power of rival interpretations of the crisis depends both on who
is advancing them and the wider appeal of their political philosophy. Given my own
intellectual and political predilections, I say with regret – but not surprise – that
interpretations likely to maintain the status quo are proving influential. To put this another
way, the considerable intellectual power of the Marxian account of the recent economic crisis
cannot, regrettably, vouchsafe its credibility or wider appeal. One of the reasons that the
recent crisis has elicited relatively mild forms of public anger – despite its severity and scale –
is surely because of the dominant storylines used to explain and address it. These storylines
key-in to the social norms and values prevailing in many countries worldwide. With a nod to
Ernst Bloch, Leo Panitch and Martijn Konings (2009, 82) phrase it like this: “Just as the
re[form] … agenda may take … the wind out of the sails of domestic opposition, so proposals
for a … more cooperative, multilateral international order may ‘prematurely harmonize’ the
contradictions generated by global power structures”. The moral economy created during the
era of neoliberalisation has not disappeared overnight (nor will it), even in the face of a global
financial crisis that has proven to be highly contagious and destructive in its effects. This is
why even a simplified rendition of Interpretation 5 would not prove persuasive to many
outside the epistemic community of (mostly) academics expounding it.
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